The offshore industry is faced with a tough financial market, requiring innovative solutions in order to reduce costs and increase operational efficiency. This includes solutions to ensure that maintaining the structural integrity of North Sea platforms is achieved as cost-effectively as possible without increasing risk or compromising safety.
Introduction
Ageing of fixed offshore platforms is a concern for Operators globally. Platforms are commonly seen in shallow water developments in the North Sea, Middle East, Offshore Malaysia and the Gulf of Mexico (GoM). Operating such installations at or beyond their design life requires a high level of confidence in the continued integrity of the platform structure. Whilst the fundamental time-dependent degradation mechanisms are similar for any steel structure in a seawater environment, they can be exacerbated by challenges specific to certain geographical locations. Examples include elevated sea temperatures in the Middle East hastening corrosion rates or the onerous seastate conditions of the North Sea. This paper focusses on the installations in the latter basin.
As of 2015 there are over 261 operational installations in the North Sea, of which 235 are categorised as a platform [1] . The variation in design of these platforms is significant and the total number comprises both drilling and production facilities handling a range of different hydrocarbons. A breakdown of these facilities by age, type, location and service is shown in Figure 1 . Considering a typical design life of 25 years, 133 of the 235 platforms have exceeded their original design life [1] . The number of platforms remaining in operation as of May 2017 is not specified in [1] but in 2015 the platforms operating beyond their design life represented 57% of the total number of platforms. This indicates the typical trend for advancement in production techniques resulting in the desire to keep such facilities operating longer than originally intended.
Extending the service life of a platform extends the time that it is exposed to time-dependent degradation mechanisms that impair its structural performance and its ability to withstand extreme load. There are two such mechanisms that are of most concern: corrosion and fatigue. Corrosion rates in steel members of an offshore platform structure are dependent on the efficacy of protection measures. Anodes fitted to the platform during original construction will have depleted over time, potentially reducing the availability of cathodic protection in later life. Moreover, protective coatings are more likely to experience damage with extended service, allowing seawater direct access to the steel and increasing the rate of corrosion. If unchecked, the consequences of corrosion may include general wall thickness loss, reducing the structural strength of platform members or local pitting corrosion leading to a through-wall breach and flooding of affected members.
Throughout the life of a platform it is subjected to wind, wave and current loading. These environmental loads cause cycling stresses in the structural members of the platform resulting in fatigue damage. The severity of the fatigue damage is time dependent as the damage is continually accruing throughout the lifetime of the installation. Fatigue damage is a concern as it can result in growth of a flaw to become a through-thickness crack and failure of the affected member. Crack propagation through fatigue is unlikely to be visible to the eye and is challenging to inspect for in subsea structures. Therefore, it is difficult to directly confirm the extent of fatigue damage in a platform structure.
Both corrosion and fatigue resistance of the structure are assessed to be sufficient for the intended service life during design. However, once this service life is reached, the residual structural integrity of the platform must be reassessed to ensure it remains sufficient for the extended period of operations. Such an assessment depends on the availability of reliable information relating to the condition of the steel members, including any wall thickness loss or other corrosion damage and the extent of marine growth build-up. 
Typical Approach
The typical approach to managing this uncertainty in structural condition is through a general visual inspection (GVI) routine in which the structure is assessed for corrosion levels and structural defects. Typically, this is conducted by ROV fly-past. This process is suitable for identifying gross visual damage to a structural member, whether this is excessive wall loss, significant pitting, or increased marine growth accumulation. However, it is limited to detecting only damage that can be observed by the human eye as this is the primary mechanism through which the survey images are interpreted. Further, the accumulation of marine growth may act to conceal underlying structural damage and hence such damage may go undetected. These limitations can be addressed through expanding the inspection workscope to include cleaning operations and marinised NDT inspection, including eddy current and ultrasonic (UT) techniques. Both of these tasks extend the duration of the ROV workscope and require additional tooling to be procured and installed on the ROV.
For these reasons, inspection can be labour and cost intensive in terms of the equipment, number of personnel and man-hours required to complete a thorough investigation. In many cases, due to the time consuming nature of the technique, the inspection is limited to selected areas which are chosen based on the location of welds, members identified as fatigue critical or in the area of the most onerous corrosion. The disadvantage of this is that there are areas of the platform which may not be selected for inspection with any regularity. This enhances the difficulty of assessing the criticality of any degradation in such areas as the time lag between inspections precludes the ability to identify when this degradation occurred. Finally, successfully extracting value from GVI data requires good management of data between inspections. Only if recent inspection findings can be reliably linked to the baselines from previous inspections can the speed with which degradation is occurring be understood. With older assets prone to being transferred between Operators, there is a significant risk of previous inspection data being mislaid and unavailable for reference during later inspections.
Inspections are typically carried out on a regular basis ranging from 6 months to 3 years. The greater the inspection frequency the higher the associated cost due to mobilisation/demobilisation and increased man-hours will be. The GVI gives an indication of the platform at the chosen interval, however, should an extreme storm event occur shortly after an annual inspection has been carried out, there is then a difficult decision to be made; either another inspection is required immediately to assess potential damage or the platform must remain in an unknown state for another year before the structural condition is confirmed.
Natural Frequency Response Monitoring
An alternative technique for the assessment of the structural condition of ageing fixed platforms is natural frequency response monitoring (NFRM). The NFRM technique measures the natural frequency of the platform structure over a period of time and detects a partial loss of integrity through the resultant change in the natural frequency of the whole structure. The technique exploits the principle that the frequencies at which any structure will vibrate are dependent on the stiffness and mass arrangement of that structure. Therefore, an offshore platform, in its as-designed state, will demonstrate a particular set of natural frequencies when subjected to environmental loads. A change in the state of the structure, for example through flooding of a member due to through-wall corrosion pitting or the loss of a welded member connection through fatigue failure, will cause a change in its stiffness and mass arrangement. In turn, this causes a shift in the natural frequency of the structure which can be detected by motion sensors. Six degree of freedom motion sensors, safe for installation in a topside environment, are readily available for rental or purchase from several established providers. In a NFRM system, these devices are installed on the topside of the platform as the magnitude of motion is expected to be greatest here due to the increased distance from the foundations. Detecting larger motions helps to mitigate the effects of background sensor noise by increasing the signal to noise ratio of the measurements. The motion measurements (typically accelerations and angular rates) are recorded as timetraces that are transferred into the frequency domain using standard Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) techniques. This process produces a frequency spectrum for each timetrace file, enabling the peak motion frequencies to be identified and compared to the peak frequencies from previous files. The process of the FFT is shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2 -FFT Data Processing
It is the frequency of the response peaks which are monitored for change as part of NFRM. A structural event, causing a change in the stiffness of the structure is thus identified as a change in the peak frequency over a short duration of the monitoring period. This is demonstrated in Figure 3 .
One of the benefits of the NFRM system is that feedback is provided to the Operator in pseudo-real time, with the only delay being caused by the necessary processing time required to perform the FFT and extract the peak frequencies. This ensures the Operator is advised on the current condition of the platform at intervals specified by the Operator during design of the system. This regularity can be tuned to be appropriate for the criticality of the structure, as determined by the upfront feasibility assessment described below. The technique directly addresses the two primary limitations of the GVI approach: cost and regularity of inspection. A NFRM system, once installed and commissioned, requires no further intervention other than scheduled maintenance checks and data interpretation from an onshore facility when a structural event is detected. Regular system monitoring can be completed remotely from the onshore base, requiring no additional mobilisation of equipment or personnel. Regular maintenance checks can be scheduled alongside other necessary topsides activities, removing the requirement for any additional mobilisation even for a normally unmanned platform. Onshore personnel can be made aware of detected events through the triggering of a remote alarm, set to pre-established KPI levels extracted from the feasibility assessment discussed below. Moreover, as an NFRM system will record data on a continuous basis, the data can be interrogated to evaluate the damage to the platform immediately after an extreme storm event, a ship collision, dropped object incident or similar. Where such interrogation confirms a frequency change is detected, a targeted offshore inspection can be mobilised to investigate the damage in more detail and allow any necessary remediation to be completed in good time. 
Feasibility Assessment
The main limitation of the NFRM approach is that it can only be relied upon as an alternative to GVI if there is confidence that a loss of structural integrity can be detected. This can be proven prior to system procurement through a feasibility assessment. Structural analysis can be carried out to assess the natural period of the structure and to model a range of potential failures to determine the expected change in natural frequency. The analysis provides the minimum frequency change that must be detected. If this is within the range of the available monitoring devices then a NFRM approach may be appropriate, otherwise, NFRM may not provide sufficient protection without being combined with other techniques. Structures that have a higher level of redundancy are less likely to be suitable for NFRM as the loss of individual members is unlikely to significantly affect the overall stiffness of the structure. Sequential losses of additional members may be required to generate a detectable effect in the frequency domain.
Conversely, less robust platforms are likely to display a greater change in frequency if a single member is compromised; the loss of a member from a small structure with fewer members will result in a more significant change in the overall platform stiffness. In the North Sea over 85% of the platforms are classed as "small steel platforms" which are ideally suited to the NFRM technique [1] .
A typical feasibility assessment will be carried out using an FEA software package, such as SACS or ANSYS. The assessment is likely to use the model developed during the design of the platform as a starting point, to reduce the cost of the feasibility assessment by avoiding the requirement to generate such a model from scratch. As the feasibility assessment relates to a platform in-situ and the model is a representation of the platform design, the as-built data must be reviewed and updates made to the model where applicable. This should include all design modifications made over the service life of the platform to-date and also include any known loss of condition, where appropriate. Strength analysis to determine the utilisation of the platform under a range of load conditions ranging from typical seastates seen on a daily basis up to an appropriate return period extreme storm is conducted. The lower environmental loading conditions are analysed to establish the expected typical motion response of the platform. These motions of the platform are used in defining the specification of the monitoring equipment to ensure that the noise level of the sensor is appropriate for typical conditions. The extreme storm loading is used to determine the structural utilisation of the platform under an extreme load [2] . This utilisation is then compared to the utilisation following the simulated failure of a member to determine the criticality of the failure, in terms of the effect on structural resistance of the remaining structure, in addition to the magnitude of change in frequency response following the event.
Modal analysis is conducted on the platform to establish its natural frequencies when intact. Natural frequencies are extracted for the first three modes, corresponding to the two degrees of sway and one degree of torsion as these modes typically lie within the range of periods expected in the North Sea environment. Typically, natural periods in the range of 2.5-5.0s for sway and 1.5s to 4.5s for torsion are calculated for North Sea platforms. Shorter period (higher frequency) modes are demonstrated by smaller, less robust structures whereas longer period (lower frequency) responses are typically of platforms with greater complexity. Higher order modes, with higher frequencies than the first three modes, are less likely to be excited by wave loading as low wave energy is associated with these frequencies.
With the base case modal response and strength utilisation established, further analysis is carried out to simulate failure of selected members. A range of members is considered. The selection of members must be undertaken with care to generate a load case matrix that covers the full range of member types and locations within the platform structure in the fewest runs possible to maximise computational efficiency. Consideration must also be given to particular members that have been identified as critical based on previous analysis or existing inspection data. Individually each member is removed from the model to simulate a significant failure of the member. The modal and strength analysis is then repeated for each "failed member".
The change in natural frequency and strength utilisation of the platform for each member is calculated. The members are plotted on a graph charting the change in natural frequency along the x-axis and the maximum strength utilisation along the y-axis, as shown in Figure 4 . The results of each load case will fall in one of the following four categories.
 There should be no data points located in quadrant 1 as the detectable limit of the monitoring equipment should be set so as to capture the change in period for a member whose loss of integrity results in a significant increase in strength utilisation. The objective of the feasibility assessment is
Learn more at www.2hoffshore.com to ascertain the appropriate intercept of the x-axis at which to specify monitoring equipment so that this quadrant remains devoid of load cases.  Quadrant 2 highlights members whose loss of integrity, although measurable, would result in a stress utilisation in excess of 1.0. Detection of such a member failing, identified by the high change in natural period, would require a timely response.
 Load cases which are located in quadrant 3 of Figure 4 are often associated with smaller auxiliary elements in a small steel structure or larger members in a structure with high redundancy. Although not detectable, loss of such members is also likely to result in minimal change in the strength utilisation of the platform, meaning the integrity of the global structure is maintained and the lack of detectability would not pose an immediate risk.
 Data points in quadrant 4 are desirable as this means that the loss of integrity in the member is detectable, however, following the loss of integrity the strength utilisation of the global platform remains below the allowable limit of 1.0.
Figure 4 -Failed Member Effect on Strength Utilisation and Natural Frequency
The change in natural frequency for members which result in a significant change to the strength utilisation covers a wide range and it is these data points which define the required detection limit of the monitoring equipment, thus the feasibility of an NFRM system. The required detection limit, represented by the dashed line in the plot is set at the point at which a change in the natural frequency also results in a change in the strength utilisation of the structure. At this point a failed member results in a partial loss of integrity to the global structure, and in order to confirm that NFRM is appropriate, the monitoring equipment must be able to detect the failure of such a member. Should the required detection limit be lower than the minimum achievable by structural monitoring equipment, it is recommended NFRM is not used without the continuation of regular inspection techniques. NFRM will still provide feedback on damage and failure to members with a more notable change in frequency, allowing for a faster response than if a system was not installed, but cannot be relied upon to detect all possible losses of partial global integrity on its own.
Case Study -North Sea Wellhead/Production Platform
The principles described above are demonstrated through a case study. An engineering assessment is carried out for two platforms located in the same field to assess the feasibility of installing and operating a NFRM system. The objective of the analysis is to determine if a NFRM system is feasible for these specific platforms and, if so, to define the requirements of the structural monitoring equipment used to capture the data. The process used to determine feasibility is exactly as outlined above.
Both platforms are located in the same field in the North Sea, a summary of key information is provided below. Each platform is addressed individually. FEA models of the as-designed platforms, amended to include structural modifications made during their service lives, are provided by the Operator of the platforms. A review is carried out of the provided models, to ensure the accuracy of the data used to create them. This review includes the platform arrangement and structural component data, soil data and metocean data appropriate for the platform locations. A number of required changes relating to the OD, wall thickness and material properties are identified and the model updated accordingly. With the model confirmed to be a good representation of the current state of the as-built platform, non-linear dynamic analysis is carried out to determine the expected fundamental period of the as-built structure. The mode shape associated with the first three modal responses is presented in Figure 5 and the modal frequencies are summarised in Table 1 . The first two responses are sway responses with lateral movement in the two perpendicular horizontal directions. The third response is a torsional response representing a twist of the platform about a central vertical axis. A review of the platform model including the structural parameters and member layout is carried out alongside a review of the design reports and the as-built strength analysis to aid the selection of the members to consider for the assessment. Members identified in the original design reports as being most susceptible to fatigue damage are selected, as are members that showed higher stress levels in the original strength analysis. The members were selected to gain an understanding of the platform response for a broad range of potential failed members. Symmetry of the structure is taken into account to avoid repetition of load cases. The members selected for the failure assessment are highlighted in red in Figure  6 .
The maximum unity check anywhere in the structure following the loss of each member is plotted against the change in natural period (as a percentage of the intact modal period) caused by the event, for platform 1, in Figure 7 . The unity check is based on environmental loading up to the 1-year return period wave and current. The response of the three members identified in Figure 6 is highlighted in the plot. Failure of member 1 results in a ~20% change in the natural period and an increase in the unity check of the most loaded remaining member from 0.43 to 0.84, remaining below the allowable of 1.0. Member 1 represents an ideal member response, in which the period response is easily detected, but which doesn't result in a utilisation greater than the allowable in any remaining member.
The failure of member 2 causes a 6% change in the period response and increases the stress utilisation in a remaining member to 1.1, in excess of the allowable. It should be noted that the stress utilisation only considers elastic behavior and is calculated for a 1-year return period storm event. Hence, this result does not indicate that the member for which this utilisation is calculated is at risk of imminent overstress. This loss of member 2 will be detected by the NFRM system and timely action can be taken to rectify the situation. A sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the impact of subsequent failure of the member which became most highly stressed following the failure of member 2. This member is failed in addition to member 2, and the result shown as the blue marker (2') in Figure 7 . This shows that the maximum stress utilisation anywhere in the remaining members reduces below 1.0, showing this sequence of events does not result in further progressive over-stressing of subsequent members.
Member 3 represents a member which can be detected without a notable increase in the stress utilisation of the remaining members. Due to the location and the number of similar members, the load from the failed member is transferred into the surrounding members without a significant change in their utilisation.
The trend shows that as the percentage change in natural period increases the unity check of the remaining members also increases. No significant increase in maximum unity check occurs for changes in natural period less than 1% of the as-is modal period. This level of accuracy is also sufficient to ensure that the majority of the failed member scenarios lie within the perceivable and UC<1 quadrant of the chart. This ensures the change in period can be detected and repairs actioned without the stress in the remaining members exceeding the allowable utilisation. Based on Figure 7 a sensor accuracy of 1% of the intact modal period is required of the structural monitoring sensor package.
Figure 7 -Effect of Failed Member Platform Assessment
The members selected for the failure assessment of platform 2 are highlighted in Figure 8 . As with platform 1 there is a point at which the unity check starts to increase, and it is here that the minimum detectable frequency limit is set. A sensor accuracy of 0.5% is recommended in the case of platform 2. The limit is more onerous for platform 2 as the smaller structure has less redundancy thus the removal of a member results in a greater load on the remaining members, and an increased unity check.
At the request of the Operator the same monitoring system is to be installed on both platforms, to enable equipment standardisation to be used to improve cost efficiency. The requirements for the monitoring system are therefore defined as the more onerous 0.5% of the natural period of the platform. These limits are used by the structural monitoring equipment supplier, for implementation in their equipment specification. 
Indicative Costing
An indicative cost model for the design, installation and maintenance of a NFRM system is presented to allow a comparison with other techniques. The cost model for any platform structural assurance technique is dependent on a number of factors, including:
 Number of platforms and location relative to one another  Variation in design across the platforms being monitored  Frequency of structural inspection and how this can be reduced, if at all, through installation of a NFRM system  Other inspection requirements (i.e. non-structural inspections such as anode depletion testing) An example is given below. For simplicity, the example considers a single platform located in the North Sea. All values presented have been normalised against the cost of structural monitoring over a six (6) year period. The cost of inspection is estimated by the Operator. The cost of the inspection of a platform can vary as mentioned above based on location, number of platforms and the level of inspection.
The cost of the alternative, including the NFRM system has been estimated based on equipment costs provided by the supplier of the monitoring equipment , engineering costs supplied by the consulting engineers and the marine growth/anode inspection based on a 10-day campaign using an inspection class ROV. Again, these costs can vary depending on a number of factors including the number of platforms, specific platform requirements, the required specification of the monitoring equipment and the level of engineering support required. The cost of the monitoring equipment includes the supply and installation of the system and costs associated with personnel and mobilisation/demobilisation.
The NFRM system in this example is a single sensor located topside. A computer processing unit (CPU), run off the platform power, is located topsides to receive and process the data.
The normalised cost of each activity is tabulated in Table 2 and shown graphically in Figure 9 . The red line in Figure 9 represents the cost of the ROV inspection regime currently conducted by the Operator for which a constant annual cost is assumed. The cost of the NFRM alternative is represented by the solid blue line. This line includes initial set-up costs (feasibility assessment, equipment, installation etc.) in addition to annual equipment rental costs. The NFRM is more expensive in the first year, however, year on year the cost savings relative to the inspection regime increase. After six years the NFRM system is expected to result in a cost saving of 60% relative to ongoing ROV inspections.
The above is based on completely replacing the inspection regime with NFRM. This may not be practicable in all cases, as requirements to conduct complementary inspections (e.g. anode depletion testing) or a necessity to phase in NFRM through a staged approach to ensure regulatory approval may remain. The blue dashed line represents the cost of the NFRM system in combination with a reduced inspection frequency of every 3 years. In this scenario, the cost savings relative to ongoing ROV inspections is reduced to 40%. 
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Summary
The offshore industry requires innovative solutions in order to maintain assest integrity at or beyond original design life cost effectively. This includes maintaining the structural integrity of North Sea platforms without increasing risk or compromising safety. Currently this is most often achieved through a GVI inspection routine; however, there is the potential for cost savings if a natural frequency response monitoring (NFRM) system is used. The advantages and limitations of a NFRM system, relative to the more common GVI method, have been presented in this paper. This includes an explanation of how a NFRM system provides the Operator with a pseudo real-time understanding of structural condition after extreme environmental or other unforseen events and how this, in turn, allows for remedial actions to be taken quickly, where required.
The appropriateness of a NFRM system must be confirmed through a feasibility assessment. This assessment will determine if loss of structural integrity can adequately be detected by a NFRM system and if so, specify the minimum required detectable limit of the monitoring equipment. The system must be capable of detecting the smallest change in natural period at which the failure of a member results in a significant increase in stress utilisation.
NFRM has an initial outlay to cover engineering services, the monitoring equipment and the installation of the system; however it has been demonstrated that this cost can be more than offset by the savings in the reduced frequency of inspection relative to other techniques. 
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